Introduction By launching a full-scale attack against Ukraine in 2022, Russia began an attempt to dismantle Europe’s security architecture and forcing a return to the security situation before the first wave of NATO enlargement (1998). The Kremlin justified its military aggression against Ukraine by claiming that the West had not kept its promise to Russia and decided to expand NATO toward the Warsaw Pact states. In the new post-Cold War security architecture, Russia would not be offered the status of 'equal partner,' as it requested. The war, however, began earlier, in 2014, when Russia illegally annexed Crimea. That moment marked a major blow to the continent’s security architecture, with Russia blowing up the normative principles that anchored the European order—enforced by the likes of the Paris Charter and the Helsinki Final Act—through the expansion of its borders. Immediately after the annexation of Crimea, a high-profile American neo-realist professor, John Mearsheimer[1], argued that the West was to blame for Russia’s aggressive behavior because,
by deciding to expand NATO eastward, the Western community had "provoked" Russia. In his argument, the American neo-realist referred to most of the classic concepts of offensive neo-realist theory, including the security dilemma, which describes a situation in which one state’s effort to enhance its security threatens the security of others. Neo-realists argue that, in the security dilemma process, misperceptions of the actors involved—namely Russia and NATO—play an important role. Given that the outcome of this war with global implications is paramount to the future of the international community and global architecture, analyzing the causes that led to its outbreak is vital. The literature on Russia’s relationship with NATO is extensive, including studies by William H. Hill[2], Angela Stent[3], Martin S. Smith[4], Roger E. Kanet[5], Mark Webber, James Sperling[6] and Rebecca R. Moore[7]. The list also includes many international relations experts who have analyzed the specifics of Russian foreign policy, such as Andrei P. Tsygankov[8], David G. Lewis[9], Dmitri Trenin[10], Brian…